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Abstract 
Sell-side analysts are professional experts while crowds are usually unsophisticated 
individual investors in the stock market. Understanding the different roles of experts 
and crowds in the stock market is a fundamental issue for both academia and industry. 
This empirical study tries to investigate their influences on the stock market by figuring 
out the following two questions: (1) Will experts and crowds have different impacts on 
stock prices? (2) Will experts and crowds discriminatively affect stock trading volumes? 
Adopting the fixed-effect model with panel data from Sogou and CSMAR, we find that 
experts and crowds have different impacts on the stock market. The wisdom of experts 
(i.e., analyst recommendation) has a more durable effect on stock prices but a smaller 
impact on stock turnover compared to the wisdom of crowds (i.e., abnormal search 
volume index). 
Keywords: Analyst recommendation, abnormal search volume index, cumulative 
abnormal return, abnormal turnover 
 
Introduction 
Sell-side security analysts and individual investors are two kinds of important participants in the stock 
market, and there are significant differences between these two groups in asset size and expertise 
(Kaniel et al. 2008). Analysts are believed to be experts with excellent abilities of collecting and 
processing information and preference for stocks of growth companies (Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Womack 
1996). However, individual investors are considered as crowds of unsophisticated noise traders with 
psychological biases (Black 1986; Kyle 1985) and preference for attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and 
Odean 2008). Therefore, they tilt towards stocks with different characteristics and affect the price 
formation as well as liquidity provision in the stock market in different ways (Schmeling 2007). 
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Given the important roles of sell-side analysts and retail investors in the stock market, it is of great 
significance to study their behavior patterns and effects on stock market. Lots of studies focus on the 
expert behavior in the stock market (Bradley et al. 2014; Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Womack 1996) or 
concentrate on the factors that affect analyst recommendation performance (Bradley et al. 2017; Hong 
and Kacperczyk 2010; Merkley et al. 2017; Mokoaleli-Mokoteli et al. 2009). On the other hand, many 
studies about the behavior of the crowds in the stock market (Barber et al. 2009; Hvidkjaer 2008; Kaniel 
et al. 2008; Kelley and Tetlock 2013) and individual investor attention (Da et al. 2011; Gargano and 
Rossi 2018; Joseph et al. 2011; Liu and Ye 2016) spring up. However, little attention has been paid to 
the differences between experts and crowds in terms of their impact on the stock market. This study 
attempts to fill this gap by figuring out the following two questions: (1) Will experts and crowds have 
different impacts on stock prices? (2) Will experts and crowds discriminatively affect stock trading 
volume?  
Our empirical work provides evidence of impacts of both experts and crowds on stock market. However, 
there are obvious differences between them. While the expert recommendation affects stock prices in a 
longer time than the attention of crowds does, the latter has a greater impact on stock turnover. This 
work makes contributions to theory development by extending research on the behavior of various 
participants in the stock market and their effects on the stock market. Practically, our findings provide 
implication about risk management and investment strategy for various participants by demonstrating 
and comparing the wisdom of experts and crowds. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the previous related research and 
put forward hypotheses in section II. Section III describes the research methods of this study, including 
data collection process, the definition and measurement of variables, and the establishment of the model. 
The descriptive statistics and empirical results are presented in section IV. Finally, we conclude our 
findings and discuss their implications in section V. 
Related Work and Hypotheses Development 
Wisdom of Experts 
The issue of whether the wisdom of experts is valuable has always been the focus of attention. The 
experts in this study refer to the analysts from the brokerage houses who contribute to the stock market 
by facilitating the information distribution, analyzing and forecasting the stock value, and providing 
analyst recommendations to investors (Brauer and Wiersema 2018; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; 
Jegadeesh et al. 2004; Kadan et al. 2009; Loh and Stulz 2011; Womack 1996). 
The wisdom of experts derives from their access to specific information and expertise in related industry 
(Brown et al. 2015), and is delivered to investors through analyst recommendations. Furthermore, their 
preference towards the stocks of growth companies adds value to their recommendations (Jegadeesh et 
al. 2004). Therefore, they are professional in evaluating the stock prices and recommending 
undervalued stocks. Besides, the analyst recommendations will promote investors’ transaction, leading 
to a higher turnover. It has been widely confirmed that the analyst recommendation is influential to 
stock prices and turnovers, and have some investment value (Brauer and Wiersema 2018; Charitou et 
al. 2018; Kudryavtsev 2019; Lin 2018; Loh and Stulz 2011).  Therefore, we put forward the following 
hypotheses: 
H1a: The analyst recommendation is positively related to stock prices. 
H1b: The analyst recommendation is positively related to stock trading volumes. 
Wisdom of Crowds 
As for another important group of players, the crowds in the stock market are mostly small and 
unsophisticated investors (Akbas et al. 2015; Frazzini and Lamont 2008) who trade on public 
information or listen to security analysts (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007; Mikhail et al. 2007), 
transmit their sentiment through the Internet (Wu et al. 2017), and exert pressure on stock prices (Kelley 
and Tetlock 2013). However, they can’t cope with all the information because of scarce attention 
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(Kahneman 1979). Among thousands of stocks, the crowds of retail investors tend to focus on arresting 
stocks, such as stocks with extreme absolute returns or huge trading volume. Therefore, the aggregate 
attention embodies the preference and wisdom of crowds. 
Many scholars are wondering whether the wisdom of the crowds has an impact on stock market. Barber 
and Odean (2008) suggest that the masses are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks according to 
attention theory. The collective attention of them will drive the stock prices up and lead to the higher 
turnovers (Da et al. 2011; Joseph et al. 2011; Liu and Ye 2016). It’s worth noting that the crowds in the 
Chinese stock market are mainly short-term speculators who prefer to realize gains quickly. Therefore, 
the attention of the crowds will generate positive price pressure in the short term and then result in 
negative price pressure in the long term as investors realize gains. Based on previous research, we raise 
the following hypotheses: 
H2a: The aggregate attention of crowds is positively related to stock prices in the short term and 
negatively related to stock prices in the long term. 
H2b: The aggregate attention of crowds is positively related to stock trading volumes. 
The Comparison of Experts and Crowds 
Analysts are significantly different from crowds of individual investors in terms of capital size, financial 
knowledge and trading patterns (Kaniel et al. 2008). 
Sell-side analysts refer to experts who have rich information sources, excellent expertise, and prefer to 
stocks with long-term investment value (Jegadeesh et al. 2004). In other words, their recommendation 
will be related to the stock prices over a longer period of time. On the contrary, Hvidkjaer (2008) depicts 
the crowds as naïve investors who realize gains quickly. His findings suggest that stocks favored by the 
crowds will suffer prolonged underperformance after a short period of price increases. Therefore, we 
put forward the following hypothesis: 
H3a: The analyst recommendation has an impact on stock prices in a longer period than the aggregate 
attention of crowds does. 
As proved by Mikhail et al. (2007), both large (institutional) and small (individual) investors trade in 
reaction to analyst reports. However, the inattention and underreaction (Andrei and Hasler 2015; 
Dellavigna and Pollet 2009) to analyst recommendation due to the limited attention and information 
explosion may weaken the impact of the analyst recommendation on stock trading volume. As a contrast, 
the aggregate attention of crowds to particular stocks captures their willingness to trade stocks, resulting 
in significant increase in trading volume. Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
H3b: The aggregate attention of crowds has a stronger impact on stock trading volumes than the analyst 
recommendation does. 
Research Methodology 
Data Collection 
The Sogou Index (http://www.zhishu.sogou.com) offers an index of aggregate search frequency of a 
specific item on daily basis, which reflects the aggregate wisdom of the masses. In order to capture the 
attention of crowds to listed company stocks more accurately and understand its influence on the stock 
market, we develop a crawler to collect daily search volume index (SVI) based on stock tickers from 
Sogou Index (see Figure 1, stocker ticker: 300059). We totally obtain SVI of 3,791 stocks. The sample 
period rages from 2016 to 2017. 
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Figure 1. SVI from http://www.zhishu.sogou.com 
Besides, the data of analyst recommendation, which reflects the expert attitude, is obtained from 
CSMAR to make a comparison between the wisdom of experts and that of crowds. The analyst 
recommendation rank in CSMAR is standardized and divided into five categories, with ratings ranging 
from -2(sell) to +2(buy). We totally obtain 278,389 sell-side analyst recommendations from 2016 to 
2017, involving 2,997 stocks. 
Following existent studies (Da et al. 2011; Liu and Ye 2016), we also control variables reflecting the 
firm performance and capital structure. Additional financial characteristics and trading data of A-shares 
are obtained from CSMAR. After deleting observations with missing data and calculation of variables, 
our dataset contains 51,848 observations for 2,708 listed firms in the Chinese A-share market from 
January 4, 2016 to December 29, 2017. 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Following Loh and Stulz (2011), we employ the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return (CAR) to 
measure stock prices, which reflects the opinion of experts and crowds. The n-day cumulative buy-and-
hold abnormal return (CAR) is defined as follows: 
 CARit = ∏ (1+Rit) 
n
t=0
- ∏ (1+Rit
DGTW)
n
t=0
 (1) 
Where Rit is the raw return of the stock i on day t; Rit
DGTW is the return on a benchmark portfolio by 
capitalization weighting with the same size, book-to-market(B/M), and momentum characteristics as 
the stock (Daniel et al. 1997). Day 0 is the day when analyst recommendation or online search occurs. 
We remove the observations when the analysts recommend stocks or the masses search for stock 
information online on weekends. 
We also adopt abnormal turnover (Abturn) following the existing study (Llorente et al. 2002) to gauge 
daily trading volumes, which reflects the expert attitude and the crowd attention. The n-day abnormal 
turnover is defined as follows: 
 
Abturnit = log (turnoverit + 1)  - 
1
n
 ∑ log(turnoveri(t+s) + 1)
-1
s=-n
 (2) 
Where log (turnover
it
 + 1) is employed to avoid the situation of zero daily turnover. Day t is the day 
when analyst recommendation or online search occurs. We remove the observations when the analysts 
recommend stocks or the masses search for stock information online on weekends. 
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To observe the fluctuations in stock prices and trading activities over various event windows, we adopt 
two-day, five-day, twenty-day, forty-day, and sixty-day event windows to incorporate the CAR and 
Abturn reflecting the analyst recommendation and individual investor attention. 
Independent Variables 
Based on previous study, we evaluate the wisdom of experts to a specific stock on day t by computing 
the daily consensus level of analyst recommendation (CON) of stock i on day t (Jegadeesh et al. 2004) 
as follow: 
 CONit = All recommendations for a given firm on day t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (3) 
Sogou provides the data of aggregate search frequency, allowing us to measure the aggregate attention 
and wisdom of crowds directly (Da et al. 2011; Mansi et al.). Following Liu and Ye (2016), we crawl 
the search frequency from Sogou Index based on stock tickers and calculate the abnormal search volume 
index (ASVI) as follows: 
 ASVIit = SVIit - SVIi,median (4) 
Where 
 SVIit =  log (1 + search frequency of stock i on day t) (5) 
 SVIi,median =  log (1 + median of search frequency of stock i during past 60 trading days) (6) 
Control Variables 
To control the performance and capital structure of the firm, some control variables are introduced in 
this study based on related studies. All variables involved in this study are defined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Dependent variables 
CAR 
Cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return calculated based on 
DGTW benchmark 
CSMAR 
Abturn Abnormal turnover calculated based on various event windows CSMAR 
Independent variables 
CON 
The consensus level of analyst recommendation which is evaluated 
by the mean of all recommendations for a given firm on day t 
CSMAR 
ASVI 
The SVI for firm i on day t minus the median SVI for given firm 
during the previous 60 trading days 
http://www.zhish
u.sogou.com 
Control variables 
AbsRet Absolute value of stock returns CSMAR 
ROA 
Return on assets which is calculated as net profit/balance of 
stockholder's equity 
CSMAR 
EPS Earnings per share which is calculated as net profit/paid-in capital CSMAR 
CAP Market capitalization, the log value is used in regressions CSMAR 
DR Debt ratio which is calculated as total debt/total assets CSMAR 
IH Institutional holding, the log value is used in regressions CSMAR 
ANA 
The number of analysts following stock i, the log value is used in 
regressions 
CSMAR 
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Model Development 
Two-way fixed effect regression model with panel data is employed as the base model to explore the 
difference between the wisdom of experts and crowds in their impacts on the stock market. And standard 
errors are clustered by firms. 
In order to investigate the impact of the recommendations from experts on stock prices and trading 
volumes, the regressions of cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return (CAR) and abnormal return 
(Abturn) on the consensus level of analyst recommendation (CON) are conducted as follows: 
 
CARit = αi + β1 CONit + β2 AbsRetit + β3 ROAit + β4 EPSit + β5 CAPit + β6 DRit + 
                β
7
 IHit + β8 ANAit + εit 
(7) 
 
Abturnit = αi + β1 CONit + β2 AbsRetit + β3 ROAit + β4 EPSit + β5 CAPit + 
                    β
6
 DRit + β7 IHit + β8 ANAit + εit 
(8) 
To understand the effect of the wisdom of crowds on stock prices and trading volumes, and compare 
their impact on the stock market with the opinion of experts, we estimate the regressions of cumulative 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (CAR) and abnormal return (Abturn) on abnormal search volume index 
(ASVI) as follows: 
 
CARit = αi + β1 ASVIit + β2 AbsRetit + β3 ROAit + β4 EPSit + β5 CAPit + β6 DRit + 
                β
7
 IHit +  β8 ANAit + εit 
(9) 
 
Abturnit = αi + β1 ASVIit + β2 AbsRetit + β3 ROAit + β4 EPSit + β5 CAPit + β6 DRit + 
                   β
7
 IHit + β8 ANAit + εit 
(10) 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Our dataset contains 51,848 observations for 2,708 listed firms in the Chinese A-share market from 
January 4, 2016 through December 29, 2017. 
We first present the correlation coefficients between variables and descriptive statistics of key variables 
in Table 2. The correlation coefficients show that CON is positively correlated with both CAR and 
Abturn. However, ASVI is positively correlated with CON in the short term and negatively correlated 
with CON in the long run, while the coefficients between ASVI and Abturn is positive and larger than 
the coefficients between CON and Abturn. Besides, the relationships between two independent variables 
(CON and ASVI) and control variables turn out to be quite different, from which we may get a glimpse 
of the different preferences of experts and crowds. 
Based on the key statistics of variables, we find recommendation distribution to be as in Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar (2014): the analyst recommendations are mostly positive as the mean of CON is 1.53 
throughout the sample period, which may be the evidence of expert optimistic bias in existing literature 
(Hong and Kacperczyk 2010; Mokoaleli-Mokoteli et al. 2009). We also show the multicollinearity test 
results at the bottom of Table 2. It is obvious that the VIF values of all independent variables and control 
variables are far less than 10, implying that there is no multicollinearity between variables (Marquaridt 
1970). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, correlation coefficient and multicollinearity test of data 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Control Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) 1.00                   
(2) 0.71 1.00                  
(3) 0.39 0.56 1.00                 
(4) 0.26 0.38 0.70 1.00                
(5) 0.21 0.30 0.56 0.80 1.00               
(6) 0.21 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.00              
(7) 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.88 1.00             
(8) 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.70 0.84 1.00            
(9) 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.64 0.77 0.94 1.00           
(10) 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.61 0.73 0.90 0.97 1.00          
(11) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 1.00         
(12) 0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.27 0.34 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.04 1.00        
(13) 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.02 0.38 1.00       
(14) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00      
(15) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 1.00     
(16) 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.10 0.03 0.38 1.00    
(17) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.31 1.00   
(18) 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.13 -0.06 -0.09 0.04 0.34 0.81 0.23 1.00  
(19) 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.27 0.45 0.03 0.62 1.00 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.42 0.02 0.09 0.71 23.45 0.44 4.29 2.69 
SD 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.56 0.02 1.12 1.23 1.02 0.20 1.03 0.69 
VIF           1.04 1.17 1.18 1.01 1.22 3.19 1.14 3.73 1.69 
Note: (1): CAR2; (2): CAR5; (3): CAR20; (4): CAR40; (5): CAR60; (6): Abturn2; (7): Abturn5; (8): Abturn20; (9): Abturn40; (10): Abturn60; (11): CON; (12): 
ASVI; (13): AbsRet; (14): ROA; (15): EPS; (16): CAP; (17): DR; (18): IH; (19): ANA.
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Empirical Results 
To explore whether the attitude of experts or crowds could predict the positive cumulative abnormal 
return, we conduct regression (7) and regression (9), respectively. The results are presented jointly in 
Table 3 for a comparison of CON and ASVI. 
As reported in Table 3, the coefficients of CON are significantly positive at the level of 0.01 for CAR2, 
CAR5, and CAR20, but insignificant for CAR40 or CAR60. It means that the stocks favored by experts 
will experience positive CAR in the following month, which is in line with H1a. 
Another interesting fact shown in Table 3 is that ASVI has significantly positive correlation only with 
CAR2 and negative correlation with CAR20, CAR40, and CAR60. That is to say, the aggregate attention 
of crowds is more likely to generate buy pressure and positive CAR in the short term; The stock prices 
then reverse in the long run and yield negative CAR, which is consist with Joseph et al. (2011), 
supporting H2a. 
By comparing the regression results in table 3, it is not difficult to find that CON is influential to CAR 
in a longer term than ASVI, thus H3a is confirmed. As the crowds in the Chinese stock market are 
speculators rather than value investors, they prefer short-term returns. The experts, however, tilt towards 
growth firms with a considerable profit and thus yield a higher abnormal return in a relative long period 
(Jegadeesh et al. 2004). 
We also investigate the impact of CON and ASVI on abnormal turnover by estimating equation (8) and 
equation (10). The results are presented jointly in Table 4 for the comparison between CON and ASVI. 
Different from the results of equation (7), CON is almost always significantly positive related to Abturn 
in Table 4. H1b is partly confirmed, although the coefficients of CON are quite small (0.001), which 
suggests that CON has significant but subtle impact on Abturn. As the crowds underreact to analyst 
recommendation due to the information explosion, traditional experts have a slight effect on the 
abnormal turnover of stocks. On the other hand, the coefficients between ASVI and Abturn are 
significantly positive, strongly confirming H2b. The results shown in Table 4 suggest that the stocks 
with more attention from the crowds usually have greater turnover, which is in line with Da Silva Rosa 
and Durand (2008). In another way, the wisdom of crowds, which is measured by ASVI, reflects the 
investor enthusiasm for transactions and leads to the increase in turnover. 
H3b is also supported by the joint results in Table 4. As mentioned above, the coefficients of ASVI are 
always positive at the 0.01 level, while the coefficient of CON is insignificant for Abturn2. Besides, the 
magnitude of coefficients in Table 4 implies that ASVI has a stronger impact on Abturn than CON does. 
This is because that ASVI captures the crowds’ tendency to trade stocks more directly. However, the 
influence of analyst recommendation on stock turnover depends on whether the crowds listen to the 
experts. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of our research is to figure out the differences between the impact of the wisdom of experts 
and that of crowds on the stock market. We use the consensus level of analyst recommendation and 
abnormal search volume index to measure the attitude of experts and crowds to stocks, respectively. 
The cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return and abnormal turnover are calculated based on various 
event windows to reflect the impacts of different players on the stock market. 
Our study enriches previous studies on the impacts of professional analysts and crowds of retail 
investors on the stock market. The empirical results suggest that experts and crowds have different 
impacts on the stock market. While the recommendation of experts has a more durable impact on stock 
prices, the attention of crowds has a stronger impact on stock trading volumes. It means that the wisdom 
of experts and crowds has important value to the management of financial risk and investment decisions. 
Our empirical findings contribute to both theory development and managerial practice. From the 
theoretical perspective, we extending research on behavioral finance from a new visual angle. We raise 
an interesting frontier question and lay the foundation for further studies on the behavior of different 
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Table 3. Different impacts of experts and crowds on cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 CAR2 CAR2 CAR5 CAR5 CAR20 CAR20 CAR40 CAR40 CAR60 CAR60 
CON 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 
 
ASVI 
 
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
AbsRet 
0.493*** 
(0.017) 
0.478*** 
(0.017) 
0.504*** 
(0.026) 
0.515*** 
(0.024) 
0.344*** 
(0.035) 
0.398*** 
(0.032) 
0.159*** 
(0.038) 
0.259*** 
(0.038) 
0.051 
(0.045) 
0.189*** 
(0.046) 
ROA 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
EPS 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
CAP 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
0.051** 
(0.020) 
0.051** 
(0.020) 
DR 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.012 
(0.023) 
-0.019 
(0.047) 
-0.019 
(0.047) 
-0.102 
(0.134) 
-0.101 
(0.134) 
IH 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
ANA 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
_cons 
-0.034 
(0.034) 
-0.036 
(0.035) 
-0.158** 
(0.068) 
-0.161** 
(0.069) 
-0.469** 
(0.210) 
-0.473** 
(0.211) 
-0.936*** 
(0.339) 
-0.940*** 
(0.341) 
-1.120** 
(0.454) 
-1.125** 
(0.456) 
Observation# 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clusters(firms) 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 
R2 0.096 0.095 0.054 0.053 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.023 
Note: Standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Different impacts of experts and crowds on abnormal turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Abturn2 Abturn2 Abturn5 Abturn5 Abturn20 Abturn20 Abturn40 Abturn40 Abturn60 Abturn60 
CON 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
ASVI 
 
 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.018*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
AbsRet 
0.368*** 
(0.008) 
0.321*** 
(0.008) 
0.376*** 
(0.009) 
0.296*** 
(0.008) 
0.399*** 
(0.009) 
0.254*** 
(0.008) 
0.413*** 
(0.010) 
0.231*** 
(0.008) 
0.421*** 
(0.010) 
0.231*** 
(0.009) 
ROA 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
EPS 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
CAP 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
DR 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
IH 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
ANA 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
_cons 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
-0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.021 
(0.024) 
-0.015 
(0.021) 
Observation# 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 51848 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clusters(firms) 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 
R2 0.209 0.224 0.210 0.250 0.204 0.310 0.205 0.355 0.200 0.357 
Note: Standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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participants in the stock market, such as research on their preference, behavior pattern, and interaction 
between them. From a practical standpoint, this work furthers the understanding of the effectiveness 
and credibility of expert recommendation, and highlight the value embedded in wisdom of the crowds. 
The findings may lead to some specific actions in response to analyst recommendation and online search 
volume, and may provide implications for risk management and investment strategy. 
However, our study has some limitations due to the sample size and measurements employed. Firstly, 
as the Sogou Index started to present the search volume index from January 1, 2016, the sample spans 
only two years, which should be extended in future research. Secondly, alternative variables could be 
introduced to measure the wisdom of experts (e.g., the changes in analyst recommendation) and crowds 
(e.g., the sentiment of crowds on the Internet) in future research to test the robustness of our results. 
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